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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE COUNTY ACQUIRED THE 
ROADS IN QUESTION BY SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS 
ESTABLISHED BY § 72-5-104 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
A. Standard of Review 
Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In order to find 
clear error, "the court 'must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are 
not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination.'" AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT 
App 168,17, 112 P.3d 1228 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 639, 635-36 (Utah 1994)). 
In cases such as these, the dedication of property to the public must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639 (Utah 1972). After the facts 
are found, appellate courts review the trial court's ultimate determination for correctness. 
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997). 
Some degree of deference must be accorded to the trial court's ruling as to the 
dedication of the roads because "the trial court is in the best position to determine 
whether the particular set of circumstances in question merits a conclusion that the 
property has been dedicated or abandoned to public use." Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 
910, 912-13 (Utah App. 1996); See also Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 
808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (granting the trial court "significant discretion in its application 
of the facts to section [72-5-104] requirements" because the legal requirements are 
"highly fact dependant and somewhat amorphous."). Broader discretion is generally 
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granted to the trial court when "the decisions are more fact-dependent, or when the 
credibility of the witnesses has a strong bearing on the decision." Kohler at 912 
(emphasis added). The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and to gain a sense of the proceeding as a whole. Where contradictory 
testimony is offered, the fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting evidence presented 
and to draw its own conclusions. Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380 % 28, 80 P.3d 553, 
cert denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). Wasatch County submits that the correct 
standard of review to be applied to the issue raised by the Okelberrys is whether the trial 
court's findings are adequately supported by the record, regardless of whether 
contradictory evidence also exists. 
B. The Okelberrys Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence in Support of the 
Trial Court's Findings. Accordingly, It Must be Assumed That All Findings 
are Adequately Supported by the Evidence. 
The evidence presented by the Okelberrys as to the interruption of the public's use 
of the roads is insufficient to defeat the trial court's finding of abandonment and 
dedication. While the Okelberrys marshal a great deal of the evidence regarding the 
frequency of the public's use of the road, they marshal virtually none of the evidence that 
rebuts their assertions regarding so-called "interruptive acts," which they claim made the 
public's use of the roads non-continuous. It is their duty to "present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 
872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This, 
the Okelberrys have failed to do. 
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The competent evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the disputed roads 
were used continuously includes the evidence that rebuts their allegations of interruption. 
Not only were the Okelberrys assertions regarding "interruptive acts" controverted by the 
County's witnesses, they were also plainly contradicted by the testimony of their own 
witnesses. None of this evidence was marshaled. For example, Lee Okelberry testified 
that the gates were not locked from 1997 through the mid-1990's, and that signs were not 
posted. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 187, 196, 199-201. Don Wood also testified that 
Forest Service maps indicated that the four disputed roads were designated and numbered 
Forest Service roads. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 45-50. In addition, evidence favorable 
to the verdict1 in the form of additional maps, testimony by the Okelberrys' own 
witnesses, including Glen Shepherd and Brian and Lee Okelberry, was not marshaled. 
Nor do the Okelberrys show that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial 
court's finding; rather they simply present the evidence supporting their position at trial 
and reargue its weight. Where evidence is inadequately marshaled, the Court is to 
assume "that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, If 19, 100 P.3d 1177. 
C. The Findings and Evidence Demonstrate that the Disputed Roads Were 
Dedicated, as a Matter of Law, to the Public. 
Section 72-5-104(1) of the Utah Code provides that "[a] highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period often years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2005). Evidence 
1
 Some of this evidence is discussed in the interruptive acts section of this brief. 
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established, and the trial court found, the disputed roads had been used continuously by 
the public as a thoroughfare for at least ten years, if not for multiple periods often years, 
effectively abandoning and dedicating them to the public under section 72-3-104(1). 
The Okelberrys argue that Utah case law has established that "the continuous use 
requirement is only satisfied when the evidence showing uninterrupted use is unrebutted 
and uncontradicted." (Appellee's Br. 23.) Although the Utah Supreme Court in Heber 
City Corp,, and this Court in Kohler, noted that the evidence presented in those cases was 
unrebutted or uncontradicted, it was not held that such is the operative legal test. 
Continuous use must be established at trial by "clear and convincing evidence," not 
unrebutted or uncontradicted evidence. Thomson, 493 P.2d at 639. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that to satisfy this requirement "members of the public must have been 
able to use the road whenever they found it necessary or convenient." Campbell 962 
P.2d at 809. This "use need not be regular to be continuous," and "[e]ven infrequent use 
can result in dedication of a road as a public thoroughfare." Id. In the case at bar, the 
trial court found that the public used the roads freely and without interruption beginning 
in the late 1950's through the late 1980's or early 1990's. Order, R. at 426, Tf4. 
Under Utah law, the use of these roads by the public was continuous. Witnesses at 
trial testified that beginning in the 1950's and prior to the locking of the gates in the late 
1980's or 1990's they were always able to use the roads. No person, gate, lock, or sign 
ever interrupted their use of the roads. They were able to "use the roads whenever they 
found it necessary or convenient," Campbell at 809 (emphasis added), and "as often as 
[they] had occasion or chose to pass." Richards v. Pine Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 
4 
(Utah 1977). The Okelberrys did not produce one witness who denied the ability to 
"come and go" on the road at will and at his convenience.2 
The Okelberrys characterize this use as intermittent and spasmodic; however, "the 
public, though not consisting of a great many persons, made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Boyer v. Clark 
326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958). That is all the law requires. The County had nine 
witnesses, a representative sampling of community users, testify to their use of the 
contested roads, though they were not the only non-permissive users of the roads. 
It was clear, even from the testimony of the Okelberrys' witnesses, that many 
people used the roads without permission. Lee Okelberry testified that the last few years 
that he was involved with the property "[t]here was more people all the time" using the 
roads. Trial Transcript, June 28 at 186. Another Okelberry witness, Glen Shepherd, 
testified that traffic had significantly increased the last ten years. Trial Transcript, June 
29 at 215. He further testified that he attended a meeting that was organized in Wallsberg 
by members of the community who believed the roads that had been closed by the 
Okelberrys should remain open. Id. at 222-23. He stated that there were "quite a few 
people" at the meeting and that everyone in attendance had claimed to use the roads. Id. 
Lee Okelberry also testified that when the land was leased to a hunting group, "a bunch 
of people" signed some sort of document at the post office, disputing the closing off of 
the roads. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 199. Presumably, those that signed had used the 
2
 Some Okelberry witnesses testified to using the Okelberrys' property and roads with 
permission. However, there was no testimony by individuals who tried to use the roads 
but were prevented from using them. 
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roads and were upset at their recent closure. Moreover, several of the County's witnesses 
testified that when they used the roads they were often accompanied by others. See, e.g., 
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 102 (testimony of Mark Butters that he used the roads with 
his family); Trial Transcript, June 28 at 157 (testimony of James Bessendorfer that he 
used the roads with his father and two sons). The evidence clearly showed that the roads 
were used non-permissively more often and by more individuals than just the witnesses at 
trial. Even so, the law does not impose a numerical prerequisite for the establishment of 
continuous use. In Boyer, the court found the road to be dedicated to the public even 
though "use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need to 
travel over it," because "those of the public who had such a need, did so." 326 P.2d at 
108. Given the rural location of these mountain roads, such a finding is likewise 
appropriate in this case. The evidence showed regular use by the County's witnesses, 
their friends, and members of their families over a period of many years. The trial court 
correctly concluded that the public's use was sufficient and continuous to warrant a 
finding of dedication. 
D. The Public's Use of the Roads Was Not Interrupted, 
The public made uninterrupted use the roads in question from the 1950's until the 
late 1980's or early 1990's. The Okelberrys argue that this use was interrupted by a 
variety of factors. The Okelberrys' argue that the roads in question were not used 
continuously, and thus not abandoned, because 1) at times persons were asked to leave 
the Okelberry property, 2) gates were kept across the roads, 3) these gates were, at times, 
locked, and 4) no trespassing signs were placed alongside the road, effectively 
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interrupting the public's use. 
The Okelberrys cite Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo for the proposition that any 
intermittent interruption of the public's use of the roads is sufficient to preclude a finding 
that a road has been abandoned and dedicated to the public. 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995). 
In Draper City the trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the city, finding the 
road abandoned and dedicated to public use. Id. at 1098. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that some affidavits indicated that "no trespassing" signs were posted at the 
gates, trespassers were at times stopped and asked to leave, the police were often called 
to the property to remove trespassers, trenches were dug and concrete blocks stacked to 
prevent use of the road, and a gate was eventually placed across the road. Id. at 1100. 
The court held that the granting of summary judgment was inappropriate where such 
facts were in dispute. Id. at 1101. The court did not hold that the existence of any one of 
these "interruptive acts" alone would preclude a finding of abandonment and dedication; 
rather, the court simply held that the weighing of evidence by the trial court at that stage 
of litigation was improper and reversed the granting of summary judgment. Id. 
The Okelberrys similarly misinterpret the facts and holding in Campbell. 962 P.2d 
806. In Campbell, the landowners established that they had kept the gate across their 
road locked at all times, except for during the hunting season, when they would unlock it 
for the duration of the hunt. Id. at 809. Several members of the public testified that they 
had been unable to use the road because of the gate. Id. In Campbell, this Court found 
that because the road at issue was generally locked, it had not been used continuously and 
consequently could not be established as a public thoroughfare. Id. This Court, in 
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Campbell, did not find, as suggested by the Okelberrys, that any interruption of public 
access, however brief, is sufficient to break the ten year period of continuous use. 
Rather, this Court held that a road open to the public a mere three weeks of each year was 
patently not available to the public for use whenever they found it necessary or 
convenient. Even if any interruptive act does serve to break the period of continuous use, 
the evidence in the instant case showed multiple ten year periods of uninterrupted public 
use of the disputed roads. 
1. The evidence established that the general public made non-permissive use of 
the roads and were never expelled for using the roads. 
The Okelberrys place a great deal of emphasis on the fact that they granted 
permission to some people to use their land and roads and, at times, expelled others. 
However, a significant portion of the testimony relied on by the Okelberrys concerning 
the granting of permission falls outside the relevant time period, i.e. after 1989. See, e.g., 
Trial Transcript, June 30 at 83-84 (written permission slip allowing use of roads and land, 
dated 8/31/2000). More importantly, many witnesses testified to using the roads for 
decades without any permission. E.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 190 (testimony of 
Martin Wall, who first used the roads in the 1950's, stating that he never asked for nor 
received permission to use the roads); see also Trial Transcript, June 29 at 141 (testimony 
of Okelberry employee, Jeff Jefferson, who stated that the majority of people he 
approached on the Okelberry property were there without permission). 
The Okelberrys argue that the trial court ignored uncontroverted evidence 
indicating that they routinely expelled non-permissive users from their roads. However, 
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the great weight of the evidence established that persons were expelled for using the land 
adjacent to the roads, not the roads themselves. The record is replete with detailed 
examples of occasions where persons found on Okelberry property were asked to leave. 
However, there was no testimony showing one specific instance where a non-permissive 
user of the roads had been expelled, simply for using the roads. 
Ray Okelberry testified that he left a note at a camp (identified as a car in the 
Okelberry brief), sometime within the last 20 years, advising the occupant that he or she 
was trespassing on private property. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 82. The camp, and its 
occupant, had been there for more than a week, and the individual was presumably on 
Okelberry property, and in fact trespassing. See Defendant's Exhibit 27. An Okelberry 
friend testified that the Okelberrys authorized him to ask non-permissive users to leave 
the property and roads. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 266. This friend, who only 
frequented Okelberry property during some hunting seasons, did not provide any 
examples or dates for his assertion that he had in fact asked anyone to leave the 
Okelberry roads, other than when he became involved in leasing the land in the mid-
1990's. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 255-56. Jeff Jefferson, an Okelberry employee, 
testified that per Okelberry policy if he saw someone on the property he would ask them 
to leave. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 141. The following discussion with Jefferson took 
place during cross-examination: 
A: Well, most of the time when people came on there they wouldn't stay on the 
road. 
Q: So people you talked to were people that were off the road on property, is that 
what you're saying? 
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A: No - - Yeah, I'd run into people like that and on the road. And I'd ask them if 
they're suppose to be on there. 
Trial Transcript, June 29 at 149 (emphasis on portion inexplicably omitted in Okelberry 
brief). Interestingly though, none of the Okelberrys testified to the existence of any 
policy regarding the expulsion of individuals either on the road or the property. Jeff 
Jefferson's testimony essentially was that he would ask people to leave the Okelberry 
property. It was only when pressed that he added the catchall property and roads 
statement. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 148-49. 
The Okelberrys' tendency to tolerate the use of the contested roads is well-
supported by the record. No witnesses at trial, who collectively used the roads from the 
1950's through the 1990's, were ever asked not to use the roads during that time. During 
one deer hunt, Brandon Richins and his grandfather were stopped, but their presence was 
not contested once they indicated that they were not going to use the Okelberry property 
and were merely using the road to access public land where they would be hunting. Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 11. Additionally, Mark Butters testified that while he was on the 
roads, he had, on occasion, passed by the Okelberrys and their sheepherders, but was 
never approached nor asked to leave the roads. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 122. In fact, 
Lee Okelberry testified that he could not recall asking anyone to leave during the 1950's 
or 1960's. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 184-85. He also testified that he had never turned 
anyone away who had business on the public lands. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 205. 
3
 Mark Butters testified that he was never asked to leave the roads. Jeff Jefferson testified 
to asking him to leave from 2000 and on, though he did not specify if this was for using 
the property or the roads. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 150-51. 
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Brian Okelberry similarly testified that he could not recall asking anyone to leave the 
property (and thus presumably also the roads). Trial Transcript, June 30 at 41. Ray 
Okelberry did not testify to expelling anyone from the area other than the instance where 
he left the note at the camp, as discussed above. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 82. 
The trial court found that the testimony at trial showed "that the Okelberrys and 
their employees have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding 
the roads." Supplemental Findings, R. at 488, ^ 7 (emphasis added). Ejection of 
trespassers from adjacent land does not interrupt the continuous use of the roads 
themselves. The evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding that individuals were 
not ejected solely for using the roads. 
2. Even when the gates were closed, they did not interrupt public use of the roads. 
The Okelberrys maintain that the trial court ignored uncontroverted evidence that 
there were gates across the roads and that the gates were, at times, closed. However, the 
evidence at trial made it evident that the gates were not always up, and when they were in 
place, they were unlocked and did not prevent or interrupt the public's use of the roads. 
Testimony was given by nearly all witnesses that the Okelberry property is fenced 
and that at times, gates crossed the disputed roads. All witnesses agreed that the fences 
and gates were "let down" during the winter months to prevent damage to such from the 
snow. There was also testimony that even in the summer months, the gates were not 
always closed and at times the gates were down. Martin Wall testified that "if there was 
no stock in there [the gates] would be down." Trial Transcript, June 28 at 189. Ed Sabey 
similarly testified that the gates are not always up and that "once the sheep and cattle is 
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gone [the gates] were hardly put up, ever " Trial Transcript, June 28 at 271, 292. 
Ray Okelberry testified that the sheep would be on the property in May and June, and 
would return at the end of September. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 69-70. Gerald 
Thompson testified that sometimes the gates were open, at other times they were closed. 
Trial Transcript, June 28 at 244. Brandon Richins similarly testified that sometimes the 
gates were up, sometimes they were not. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 12, 25. Shane Ford 
testified that the gates would be open or closed, depending on which pasture the sheep 
were in. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 232. Lee Okelberry also testified that the gates were 
not up at all times during the summer. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 197. 
Moreover, testimony indicated that the primary purpose of the gates was to keep 
the livestock on Okelberry property, not to control use of the road by the public. See 
Trial Transcript, June 30 at 25 (testimony of Brian Okelberry that "the purpose of the 
gates . . . is to keep the sheep in tack"). If sheep were to wander off the property the 
Okelberrys would be fined by the forest service. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 135. Lee 
Okelberry testified that cattle guards were put in because the wire gates would sometimes 
get cut off or rolled back, indicating that first and foremost, the purpose of the gates was 
livestock control. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 198. 
The significance of an unlocked gate as an interruptive force in the context of 
section 72-5-104 has not been addressed by any appellate court in Utah. Some cases 
have, as pointed out by the Okelberrys, addressed the presence of gates without 
indicating whether the gates were locked. However, the language of the opinions 
indicates that more likely than not these gates were in fact locked. See e.g., AWINC 
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Corp., 2005 UT App 168, % 3 (noting that "[t]he gates prevented use" of the road); 
Kohler, 916 P.2d at 914 (finding the gate prevented use of the road). A gate that is 
unlocked hardly prevents the public's access to and use of any particular road. 
The language used in section 72-5-104 is instructive. Section 72-5-104 requires 
that a roadway be "continuously used." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. An unlocked gate 
does not prevent or interrupt the public's use of a road. In this case, witnesses testified 
that when the gates were up and closed they would simply open them, go through, and 
close the gates behind them. See e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 189-90 (testimony of 
Martin Wall that when the stock was in and the gates were up, "we would honor them, 
leave them the way we found them"); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 233 (testimony of 
Gerald Thompson that if a gate had to be put down to get in he would put it back up after 
going through). Lee Okelberry also testified that most people respected the gates' 
obvious livestock purpose and would close the gates behind them. Trial Transcript, June 
29 at 197-98. In this case, where the roads run through sheep country, it would be 
incongruous to allow such gates to serve as an interruption. Under the Utah Code, it is 
permissible to keep unlocked gates on Class B and D public roads. Utah Code Ann. § 
72-7-106. Clearly, the mere presence of an unlocked gate would not serve as an 
interruptive act, particularly where the evidence established and the trial court found that 
the presence of gates was in fact not interruptive and did not affect use of the disputed 
roads. The trial court stated the presence of gates "did not prevent travel" and that prior 
to the installation of locks, "the roads in question were subject to continuous use . . . ." 
Order, R. at 425-26, Tf2, 4. The record adequately supports that finding. 
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3. The public made continuous use of the roads for more than thirty years before 
locks were placed at the gates. 
The majority of the testimony presented at trial, by both sides, was that prior to the 
late 1980's or early 1990's the gates were not locked. The trial court found that the 
Okelberrys had locked the gates "at various times in the past." Supplemental Findings, 
R. at 488, f 5. This is hardly to say that the trial court found that the gates were locked 
"periodically" as argued by the Okelberrys. In fact, the trial court found that the public 
used the roads "without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not 
constantly, they used the roads continuously as they needed." Order, R. at 426, [^4. 
Ray Okelberry testified that he began locking some of the exterior gates in the late 
1950's. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 135. He also testified that he locked the gates when 
moving the sheep. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 138-39. Ray Okelberry's testimony was 
directly contradicted by the testimony of his brother, Lee Okelberry, who testified that 
locks were not put on the gates while he was involved with the property (1950's through 
mid-1990's) and that he had never locked a gate. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 187, 196, 
201. When shown a photograph of the lock on one of the gates, Lee testified that "I 
never had to go through it. I don't remember seeing that there. That's been put there 
after I left." Id. at 201. Brian Okelberry also testified that he believed the first locks 
were not placed on the gates until at least the 1980's. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 54. 
Neither Lee nor Brian Okelberry testified to locking the gates while moving sheep. Nor 
did the Okelberrys' employee Jeff Jefferson. As noted by the Okelberrys, not until the 
late 1980's or early 1990's did any County witnesses encounter locked gates. 
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The bulk of the evidence, presented by both the County and the Okelberrys, 
indicates that the gates were not locked until the late 1980's or 1990's. The trial court 
found that even if Ray Okelberry did lock the gates while moving sheep, "it is clear that 
individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950's until the late 1980's or early 
1990's used the roads without interruption . . . ." Order, R. at 426, |^4 (emphasis added). 
Such a finding is in harmony with Utah case law. In Thurman v. Byram, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the disputed road had become dedicated to the public by 
continuous use, even though the property owners had periodically blocked the road "to 
facilitate the movement of sheep." 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). The trial court's 
finding that for more than thirty years the public made use of the roads whenever they 
found it necessary or convenient is supported by substantial evidence. 
4. Signs indicating that the roads could not be used were only posted when the 
gates began to be locked. 
The posting of signs along the Okelberry property did not prevent the public from 
using the roads, nor did the signs convey the message that use of the roads was 
prohibited. The Okelberrys maintain that because there is conflicting evidence regarding 
the posting of "no trespassing" signs, the trial court's conclusion regarding such was 
inappropriate. (Appellee's Br. 38). Though correctly noting that the "clear and 
convincing" standard applies in dedication cases, the Okelberrys fail to appreciate that 
the trial court is required to weigh conflicting evidence. Evidence need not be 
uncontroverted in order to be "clear and convincing." The presence of conflicting 
testimony is not sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court's findings are clearly 
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erroneous. It is an "elemental rule that the fact trier may believe one witness as against 
many, or many against one." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P2d. 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
The overwhelming majority of the testimony at trial regarding the posting of signs 
addressed the presence of these signs along the roads. Ray Okelberry testified that he 
placed signs along the roads around the time that the property was purchased by the 
Okelberry family in the late 1950's. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 137. Ray Okelberry's 
assertion, however, is at odds with Lee Okelberry's testimony that such signs were not 
put up at that time because such signs were not needed. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 187. 
Furthermore, there was no testimony given that signs along the roads indicated that use of 
the roads was prohibited. Instead, at most, they appear to have served as reminders to 
travelers that the property on either side of the roads was private. 
The only testimony specifically addressing the presence of signage at the 
boundary gates came from Brian Okelberry and Jeff Jefferson. Brian Okelberry testified 
to the presence of signs on boundary gates from the 1970's on. Trial Transcript, June 30 
at 23-25. Again, such testimony is in conflict with the testimony given by Lee Okelberry 
who testified that signs were not posted until after he had been phased out by Ray (in the 
mid-1990's) and the land was being readied for lease to a hunters group. Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 199-200. Jeff Jefferson, who began to work for the Okelberrys in 
1977 at the age of fourteen, testified to the presence of signs on all entrances. Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 135. He did not indicate when these signs first appeared, though 
perhaps representative, he testified that it was not until 1992 that a "no trespassing" sign 
was placed at the Circle Springs entrance. Id. at 131. 
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The great weight of the testimony presented at trial was in harmony with Lee 
Okelbeiry's testimony. See e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 112-114, 125 (testimony of 
James Bessendorfer that signs did not appear until the mid-1990's); Trial Transcript, June 
29 at 69 (testimony of Benny Gardner that signs at entrances began showing up after 
United Sportsman's came in); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 107, 123 (testimony of Mark 
Butters that signs at entrances appeared in the 1990's). Brian Okelberry testified that he 
did not start placing signs until the late 1980's and that United Sportsman's posted some 
signs in 1989 or 1990. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 39, 47, 51. 
This Court, in AWINC Corp., found that although there was evidence that "no 
trespassing" tires and rocks were placed along the disputed roads, "the signs conveyed, 
and were intended to convey, the message that travelers should stay off [ the] . . . 
property, not that travelers should stay off the [road] in particular." 2005 UT 1fl5. This 
Court went on to observe that "this was the understanding of those using the road during 
this period." Id. In the instant case, some witnesses testified to seeing "no trespassing" 
signs on the Okelberry property in recent years. They further testified that it was their 
understanding that the signs applied only to the property, not the roads. See Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 14 (testimony of Brandon Richins that he assumed that the signs 
referred to the property and that the roads could be used to drive through and onto public 
land); Trial Transcript, June 29 at 72, 91 (testimony of Benny Gardner that he understood 
the signs to mean that he was not to get out of his truck and go onto the property); Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 110 (testimony of Mark Buttars that he believed use of the roads 
was permissible as long as he stayed off the property). There was no evidence indicating 
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that the signs referred to use of the road. The trial court found that "no trespassing" signs 
were placed "along these roads," Supplemental Findings, R. at 488, ^ |6, indicating that 
the Court found the credible testimony to be that signs were posted on the property and 
were to warn passersby that use of the property, not the roads, was prohibited. 
The record adequately supports the trial court's finding that the public's use of the 
roads was not interrupted by expulsion, gates, locks, or "no trespassing" signs. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PLAINLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A FINDING OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
HAVE NOT BEEN MET. 
A. The Public Can Only Lose It's Interest in a Public Road by Strict Compliance 
with the Formal Abandonment Proceedings Set Forth in Section 72-3-108 of 
the Code. 
Once established a public road continues as such until vacated or abandoned. Utah 
case law requires strict compliance with section 72-3-108 when vacating the public's 
interest in a roadway. See e.g., Erckanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 587 (Utah 1974); 
State v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104, 2005 WL 648099 (March 16, 2006). In 
the case at bar, the public's interest in the roads vested entirely and completely when the 
requirements of dedication were met in the late 1960's. That interest cannot be vacated 
or abandoned without satisfying the procedural requirements outlined in section 72-3-
108. In Clark v. Erekson, the Utah Supreme Court held that while the appellants had 
encroached on the disputed road by placing fences, buildings, and trees thereon for a 
period of time exceeding thirty years, this was ineffective in extinguishing the interest the 
public had acquired in the road, as the statutory requirements for vacation had not been 
met. 341 P.2d 424, 425-26 (Utah 1959). 
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B. The Facts of this Case do not Justify the Application of Equitable Estoppel 
Against the Government. 
It is well-established that equitable estoppel may be applied against the government 
only in the most "exceptional cases." The circumstances in this case are far from 
exceptional and do not warrant a finding of equitable estoppel against the County. The 
Supreme Court of Utah, quoting Judge Dillon, an expert in municipal law, stated that in 
order to apply equitable estoppel against the government "[t]he acts relied on must be of 
such character as to amount to a fraud, if the [government] were permitted to claim 
otherwise." Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766, 772 (Utah 1917) (italics omitted). The 
facts in the instant case simply do not rise to the level of fraud. The Utah Supreme Court 
more recently reaffirmed this position, holding that: 
While there may be circumstances so extreme that we would be willing to uphold the 
application of equitable estoppel to prevent the assertion of rights in a public highway, 
we are unwilling to do so in this case. We are extremely reluctant to apply the 
doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in a public highway by a 
government entity. . . . Where, as here, the landowner has not substantially altered his 
position to his detriment in reliance on the asserted nonuse of the roadway by the 
public, estoppel should not be available to circumvent the statutory process. 
Western Kane County v. Jackson Cattle Co., 1AA P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987) (emphasis 
added). This case is far from exceptional and does not warrant a finding of equitable 
estoppel. Here, the Okelberrys did not rely on the "nonuse of the roadway by the public." 
Their installation of locks and placement of signs was, in fact, openly hostile to the 
public's longtime use of the roads at issue. The facts also show that the public strongly 
protested the placement of the locks on the gates, effectively rebutting any assertion that 
the Okelberrys relied on the public or County's inaction. The facts also reveal that the 
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Okelberrys would not suffer any serious injury were the roads to remain open to the 
public as they were for more than thirty years. 
C. The Elements of Equitable Estoppel Are Not Satisfied. 
i . The County and public acted consistently with claims of ownership. 
The County and the public acted consistently with their claimed interest in the 
roads. The public used the roads continuously for a period of time exceeding thirty years, 
and even to some degree following the Okelberrys attempts to restrict access to the 
disputed roads. See e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 109, 111, 117, 125, 275, 313 and 
June 29 at 16, 27, 64 (testimony given by various witnesses that they used the roads in 
the late 1990's through 2003). The Okelberrys list several actions they claim 
demonstrate inconsistency with the public's current assertion of ownership. However, 
these assertions, individually or collectively, are simply insufficient to support a finding 
of inconsistency on the part of the public. 
First, the Okelberrys point to the County's failure to maintain the disputed roads. 
The County could find no authority requiring government maintenance for dedication. 
Though the government's maintenance of a road might well be evidence of dedication, 
the absence of maintenance does not establish inconsistency. Were this the case, it would 
be next to impossible for any road to be dedicated to the public, even if the statutory 
requirements outlined in the previous section were satisfied, rendering the statute 
practically worthless. Even so, several witnesses at trial testified to clearing the road on 
numerous occasions to make the road passable; the same "maintenance" activity engaged 
in by the Okelberrys. See e.g., Trial Transcript, June 28 at 139-40, 181-82, 285 and June 
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29 at 86-88 (testimony of various County witnesses that they often removed fallen trees). 
Don Wood also testified that these roads appeared on Forest Services maps as roads 
maintained by the Forest Service. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 48. 
The Okelberrys next argue that because the County permitted them to place "no 
trespassing" signs alongside the roads, the County acted inconsistently with its current 
position. The placement of "no trespassing signs" on Okelberry property is clearly 
permissible and the County would have no reason to tell them otherwise. This is 
particularly true where the public understood the signs to apply only to the property and 
not the roads. There is some testimony that signs later appeared on the gates, largely in 
connection with the hunting activities on the property, though by this time the public's 
interest in the roads had already vested. 
Moreover, the Okelberrys maintain that tolerating gates and at times locks is a 
display of inconsistency. Utah law allows for the placing of unlocked gates across 
certain types of roads. Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106. Utah Code also states that the 
person for whose immediate benefit a gate is erected and/or maintained is to bear the 
expense. Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106(3). As discussed previously, the trial court found 
the testimony that the gates were not locked until the 1990's to be the most credible. This 
is well after the roads had become dedicated to the public. Furthermore, while the gates 
began to be locked periodically in the 1990's, the public strongly objected, in many cases 
continuing to use the roads, and ultimately complaining to Wasatch County. This 
behavior put the Okelberrys on notice that their right to prevent use of the roads was 
being challenged. Lee Okelberry testified to these escalating tensions as gates were 
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locked. Trial Transcript, June 29 at 199. Once Wasatch County officials were made 
aware that access to the roads was being prevented, they took appropriate steps to protect 
the public's interest in the roads. This is not inconsistent with its current position, nor 
can it be characterized as inaction. 
The Okelberrys go on to argue that the County allowed them to expel individuals 
from the road. As discussed in detail above, there is little evidence, if any, to support the 
assertion that the Okelberrys ever, let alone routinely, expelled non-permissive users 
solely for using the roads. As the trial court found, the Okelberrys and their employees 
asked "persons to leave the property surrounding the roads." Supplemental Findings, R. 
at 488, ^ [7 (emphasis added). The County could hardly be expected to ask the Okelberrys 
refrain from doing something they were not doing. Next, the Okelberrys cite to their sale 
of trespass permits as further establishing inconsistent behavior. The sale of permits for 
use of one's property is permissible. The Utah Supreme Court upheld a finding of 
dedication where property owners issued hunting permits for their property. Thurman, 
626 P.2d at 449. In the case at bar, there was no testimony indicating that these trespass 
permits were issued solely for use of the roads; the permits were purchased to allow 
hunting on the Okoibcrry property. Trial Transcript, June 30 at 36-37. Mark Butters 
testified to "[bjuying the permits to allow us to be able to hunt or use Okelberry's 
property." Trial Transcript, June 29 at 116. He further testified that it was his 
understanding that the permits did not address use of the roads, as use of the roads for 
access to forest service property by the public was allowed. Id. The County would have 
no reason to ask the Okelberrys to cease selling permits for use of their property, and thus 
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cannot be found to have had inconsistently for allowing such sale. 
Lastly, the Okelberrys argue that the County acted inconsistently by allowing them 
to lease their property for use by private hunting units. Again, allowing the Okelberrys to 
lease their property to hunting units is not inconsistent with the County's assertion that 
the roads are public. Though the leasing of this land was often accompanied by the 
locking of the gates, as discussed above, the public and ultimately the County challenged 
the Okelberrys right to restrict access to the roads by locking the gates, thus acting 
consistently with their interest in the roads. 
2r The Okelberrys did not alter their position in reliance on County action or inaction 
Another significant problem with applying equitable estoppel in this case is the 
absence of reliance. By the time the Okelberrys began locking their gates in the early 
1990's, the public had been using the roads "as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for 
recreation" for more than thirty years. Order, R. at 425, Tf6. The locking of the gates and 
placement of signs was openly hostile to the public's longtime use of the roads. The 
Okelberrys could not rely on "nonuse" because the roads were being used continuously 
by the public and had been for more than thirty years. Lee Okelberry acknowledged that 
he was aware that the public used the roads and that in the last few years he was involved 
with the property all the roads were being used by "more people all the time." Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 186. The Okelberrys and their associates were also very aware that 
their locking of the gates was seriously challenged by the community. See e.g., Trial 
Transcript, June 29 at 134, 147 (testimony of Jeff Jefferson that wire gates were being 
ripped out "constantly"); Trial Transcript, June 30, 258, 261 (testimony of Bruce Huvard 
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that gates, locks, and signs were damaged by the public in the 1990's). Furthermore, 
there were no representations, written or otherwise, made by the County indicating to the 
Okelberrys that it was, on behalf of the public, abandoning any interest in the roads. As 
noted earlier, when the locks were placed on the gates the public protested, and ultimately 
Wasatch County authorities were contacted. 
Locks were not installed by the Okelberrys because they believed that the roads 
were not being used. By locking the gates the Okelberrys recognized that the public was 
freely using the disputed roads and sought to prevent further use. When the locks were 
placed at the gates, the Okelberrys were met with a significant amount of protest. Bruce 
Huvard testified that in the 1990's, when he leased the property for hunting, it was 
difficult to control access on the property because of public uproar. Trial Transcript, June 
29 at 261, 265. To suggest that the Okelberrys locked the gates and were lulled into a 
sense of security in their right to control the roads by the County's failure to immediately 
initiate legal action disregards the evolution of the controversy that eventually led to the 
filing of this legal action. There was no reliance on the public's nonuse of the roads prior 
to the locking of the gates because the public was using the roads. Nor was there reliance 
on a submissive public response once the gates were locked because, as noted by 
witnesses, the public repeatedly challenged the Okelberrys' actions. For these reasons, 
this element of the inquiry fails. 
3. The Okelberrys will suffer no serious injury if the roads remain public. 
The Okelberrys also argue that they will suffer greatly if the status quo of the last 
forty years resumes. The only testimony in the entire trial record regarding potential 
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injury was given by Ray Okelberry who testified that his sheep and cattle operation 
would be put out of business were the roads to be reopened to the public. Trial 
Transcript, June 30 at 140. There was no explanation offered for why this would be the 
result when the sheep and cattle operation coexisted with the public's use of the roads for 
a period of time exceeding thirty years. Though not testified to by the Okelberrys, nor 
found in the record, the trial court believed that Shane Ford would not renew his 
Corporative Wildlife Management Unit lease on the Okelberry property were the roads 
reopened to the public. However, it is worth noting that there was no testimony that Ford 
would renew his lease in any case or that other hunting groups would be unwilling to 
lease the land. Even if the Okelberrys were unable to lease the land to such private 
groups, there is no indication that they could not again sell trespass permits to their 
property. Most importantly, even if evidence did support any of these foregoing potential 
financial setbacks, the Okelberrys should not be allowed to grieve the loss of income 
acquired by wrongfully restricting access to public roads. 
Equitable estoppel is not properly applied in this case as the elements for such a 
finding cannot be established by the facts of this case, nor do they rise to a level 
sufficiently egregious to warrant a finding of equitable estoppel against the government. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the trial court's finding that these roads are dedicated to 
the public and overturn the trial court's ruling on estoppel. 
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DATED this ^ day of May, 2006. 
ScotfH. Sweat 
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